Introduction
This paper explores an important recent development in the process of international climate change governance. That development is the formation of a number of selective state-based forums for dialogue and/or decision-making on climate change outside the understandings are generated, disseminated, and internalised through the efforts and discourse of diverse actors … In the constructivist view, even as states and other actors create norms and institutions to further their interests and values, those norms and institutions are redefining those interests and values, perhaps even the identities of the actors themselves. (Abbott 2004: 367) .
The constructivist emphasis on ideas, which are often referred to as 'norms' in this literature, is an obvious common starting point for interdisciplinary research designs incorporating IL and constructivist IR theory (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97) .
The constructivist IR tradition is divided into two broad strands. Firstly, conventional constructivism, seeks to trace the causal impact of identities and norms on state behaviour (100). 2 The conventional constructivist approach is concerned with identifying the causative effect of particular ideas or norms on state behaviour during a specific event or series of events in the international system (100). Conventional constructivist work adopts a research design more closely aligned with the positivist social science paradigm in formulating hypotheses regarding the causal influence of norms on past state behaviour and subjecting them to empirical testing and investigation (Pettenger 2007: 9-10) . However, the second strand of constructivist work, critical constructivism, is less wedded to the positivist paradigm. Critical constructivism is more concerned with 'uncovering the power relations that underpin and are reproduced by social relations, including knowledge-creating and knowledge-laden relations' that privilege some actors over others (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97) . Finnemore and Sikkink describe critical constructivism as having:
intellectual roots in critical social theory, including such figures as Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault. Although it shares the core features of constructivism identified above, critical constructivism adds a belief that constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power. Critical constructivists believe that certain powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of social construction. The task of the critical scholar is both to unmask these ideational structures of domination and to facilitate the imagining of alternative worlds. Critical constructivists thus see a weaker autonomous role for ideas than do other constructivists because ideas are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of material power. (2001: 398) Critical constructivist IR theory is thus concerned with how ideas are used as an expression of power to shape the intersubjective meaning of international phenomena and the interests of the actors concerned. Critical constructivist IR theory usefully complements IL research in providing a theoretical framework for analysis of the political context in which international law and international legal institutions are formed. Unlike conventional constructivism, the critical IR approach does not seek to test the effect of international law as a causal mechanism on particular instances of state behaviour. 3 Rather, critical constructivism provides understanding of the power-laden web of intersubjective meaning embodied in international law and legal institutions.
Critical constructivist IR theory also offers a theoretical framework for analysing how such intersubjective meaning is contested and altered over time. The 'critical' (i.e. emancipatory) potential of constructivism is in providing understanding of the powerladen web of intersubjective meaning that constitutes, and is constituted by, international law and legal institutions. This understanding opens up the possibility of international collective self-reflection for change. As Neufeld explains:
it is clear how interpretative approaches offer support for notions of progressive and emancipatory change in the global order. The intersubjective meanings which constitute the global order are themselves the product of an ongoing process of self-definition and self reflection, they are, then like all practices which instantiate them, open to change. (1993: 58) Current international law, institutions and practices might therefore be viewed not as a natural 'given' reality, impervious to substantial change, but rather one of many possible socially constructed orders of intersubjective meaning available to the international community (Neufeld 1993: 59) . A critical constructivist understanding of international affairs thus opens the possibility for understanding discursive contestation over current international law, legal institutions and practices (Dryzek 2006) .
Interdisciplinarity: Critical Constructivist IR Theory and International Law
Despite the areas of common ground between the theoretical frameworks of critical constructivist IR theory and international legal analysis there have been only limited attempts to specifically link the two in research design. One of the more substantial explorations of the use of critical constructivist IR theory in analysis of international institutions is contained in the work of John Dryzek (2005; 2007: 44-62) . 4 Dryzek invites international lawyers to look beneath the text of an international agreement to the underlying ideas and intersubjective meanings upon which the agreement is structured. 5 Dryzek refers to this set of underlying ideas and intersubjective beliefs as a 'discourse,' which he defines as 'a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents with a framework for making sense of situations, embodying judgements, assumptions, capabilities, dispositions and intentions ' (2006: 1) .
3 Even more adventurous sociological analysis within international legal scholarship has not been able to prove international law as a decisive causal mechanism in the behaviour of states, see Chayes (1974) . 4 See Dryzek (2006: 23) for discussion of the critical constructivist research design of his work. 5 Dryzek (2007: 60) uses the IT metaphor that discourses 'can provide the "software" that makes international regimes work, while more formal organizations and rules provide the "hardware.'" PORTAL, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011. 5
Dryzek provides a typology of the more prominent discourses operating in environmental governance and international politics more generally over recent decades (2005; 2006; 2007; 2009). 6 He suggests that discourses are social structures that both enable and constrain actions (Dryzek 2006: 24-25) . 7 Discourse is constraining in the sense that it is constitutive of the subject dispositions and capacities of actors and is produced and reproduced by subsequent actions and interactions (Dryzek 2007: 62) .
Discourse is also enabling in the sense that actors draw on existing discourses to 'subtly affect the content and weight of discourses' within a given social structure (Dryzek 2006: 24-25) . Dryzek thus comments:
Discourses can embody power in that they condition norms and perceptions of actors, suppressing some interests whilst advancing others. Discourses pervade, constitute, and help explain the structure of international affairs. The power of discourses arises in their ability to structure and coordinate the actions of individuals' subject wholly or partly to them. (2006: 3) Dryzek argues that some discourses are 'hegemonic' in the sense that they are so ingrained in social structures that they are 'not even recognised by those subject to them, but are instead treated as the natural order of things ' (2006: 8) . However, discourses are not static. Over time, coalitions of actors (that is, discourse coalitions) emerge with alternate discourses that seek to contest even hegemonic discourses (Dryzek 2006) . This contestation leads to change through either a dialectical accommodation/merging of competing discourses or the defeat of a competing discourse. Although Dryzek argues that discourses are important in understanding international affairs, he importantly points out that they cannot alone explain international social life and collective outcomes. Dryzek concedes that other factors such as material factors and non-linguistic practices are also important (2007: 62) . This article adopts Dryzek's concept of discourse in analysing contestation over the process of international climate governance that flows from the emergence of the selective state-based climate governance forums introduced above.
Leading models of democracy
Democracy is itself a highly contested concept (Dryzek 2010: 21 Deliberative democracy is thus concerned with the 'authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged in At an international level, there is no institutional equivalent to the sovereign of the domestic liberal democratic state that has the power to make, enforce and administer laws that may override the consent of an individual citizen. The various institutions of the United Nations system (that is, the Security Council, General Assembly, and
International Court of Justice) come the closest to replication of the functions of the domestic sovereign, however, ultimately derive their authority from the ongoing consent of the states involved. Despite the lack of an equivalent to the domestic sovereign, liberal and deliberative theories of democracy have been used to analyse the democratic credentials of international institutions. The liberal democratic model of democracy has been adapted to the international sphere through the concept of cosmopolitan democracy as developed by authors such as Held (1995; 2002; Archibugi (1995; 2004) . Cosmopolitan democracy posits not only the furthering of government by democratic popular election at a domestic level but also the extension of democratic process to governance between states at a regional and global level (Archibugi 2004; 442-452) . Held (2009: 538) However, cosmopolitan democracy also focuses on protection of the rights of the individual within the domestic state, with each individual to be accorded equal worth and dignity, active agency and personal responsibility (Held 2002: 24) . As Held explains:
In the first instance, cosmopolitanism can be taken as those basic values that set down standards or boundaries that no agent, whether a representative of government, state, or civil association should be able to cross. Focussed on the claims of each person as an individual or as a member of humanity as a whole, these values espouse the idea that human beings are in a fundamental sense equal and deserve equal political treatment (2002: 23) At its more ambitious edge, the cosmopolitan democratic project proposes direct citizen election of representatives to supranational institutions that would have the authority to override state sovereignty (Monbiot 2003) . The primary focus of all variants of cosmopolitan democracy is to extend the aggregative, reconciliatory and accountability features of the domestic liberal democratic model into international governance structures. The underlying premise of the cosmopolitan project is that individual citizens will come to see themselves as world citizens and hence subordinate their more local identities and interests to a common global project (Dryzek 2006: 153) . However, Dryzek's discursive democracy is a model for the pursuit of democratic ideals in international society that draws more particularly on the deliberative tradition of domestic democratic theory. Dryzek argues that in the international sphere, which lacks centralised authority and has more dispersed power structures, the deliberative democratic project is best pursued through a democratic design that is:
transnational and discursive, highlighting dispersed and competent control over the engagement of discourses in transnational public spheres, which in turn constructs or influences international outcomes in a variety of ways. Transnational democracy of this sort is not electoral democracy, and it is not institutionalised in formal organizations. Instead it is to be sought in communicatively competent decentralised control over the content and weight of globally consequential discourses, which in turn resonates with theories of deliberative democracy stressing communicative action in the public sphere … The public sphere encompasses social movements and media communications, and can reach into corporations, states, and intergovernmental organisations. It is an informal, communicative realm that can be contrasted with the constitutional exercise of authority. (Dryzek 2006: 154) The weakness of centralised authority in the international system and recourse to principles of state sovereignty (that is, sovereign independence) to avoid international obligations are no impediments to discursive democracy. The 'transnational public sphere' of civil society movements and media operations does not require a centralised source of authority or state consent in order to engage citizens and other actors in reflective, deliberative and communicative processes. As Dryzek explains, activity in the international public sphere has a capacity to shape actor perceptions, interests and identities and hence the outcome of more formal international institutions (2000: 121-122). The formal institutions of international society thus embody and reproduce discourses. The discourses operating in the transnational public sphere and formal international institutions therefore operate in a mutually constitutive manner (121).
Multilateralism and minilateralism in international climate governance
Multilateralism in international affairs involves 'creating international bodies, agreements, and rules through negotiation on the part of the states that will be subject to the arrangements in question, who agree to be bound by the arrangements' (Dryzek 2006: 129) . The creation of formal rule-based institutions at an international level to foster a cooperative approach to international issues lies at the heart of the multilateral project. However, this does not mean that multilateral institutions will all have a high level of democratic process. The United Nations Security Council is one of the key multilateral institutions of the post-war period, yet its five permanent members (that is, the victorious allied powers of WW2) have an individual veto power over any substantive decisions of that forum. 8 The democratisation of multilateral institutions is one of the key elements of the cosmopolitan democratic project an international level, as discussed above (Dryzek 2006: 129 (1996) . Draft Rule 42 contains two draft voting rules for the COP to make decisions on 'matters of substance.' The first rule allows for a retreat from a consensus voting rule to a two-thirds or three-quarters majority voting rule once attempts to reach consensus are exhausted. The second requires a consensus vote except on financial matters. 11 Consensus is generally taken to be present if no party raises a formal objection to a particular decision; see Farhana & Depledge (2004: 443-444) . 12 The consensus decision-making rule within the UNFCCC appeared to be strained at the 2010 COP 16 meeting in Cancun, Mexico. Towards the end of the COP meeting, the COP President chairing the meeting, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Ms Espinosa, overruled the express formal objection of Bolivia, in order for the COP to formally adopt a package of decisions on mitigation, climate finance, adaptation and technology (Vihma 2011 In the area of international cooperation the solutions lie in efforts to create a club of a small number of important countries and craft the elements of serious cooperation. The efforts probably can't emerge within the UNFCCC process because it is too large and inclusive. Nor can it easily arise from other available forums such as the G8, because their membership is too skewed to include the dozen or so countries that must be part of an effective solution. The most interesting idea for a new institution is outgoing Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin's concept for a forum of leaders from the twenty key countries. (Victor 2006: 101) This call for key decisions on international climate change governance to be reduced to a select forum of key states has been echoed by US foreign policy commentator Wright The large bulk of greenhouse gas emissions is produced by only a limited number of countriesas far as mitigation is concerned, what the majority of states do pales in significance compared to the activities of the large polluters. Only a limited number of states have the capability seriously 14 As Fisher (2010: 11) describes it, following COP 15 at Copenhagen there were criticisms particularly from ENGO groups claiming they were disenfranchised during the meeting. This is discussed further in this article. 15 It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the claims to greater effectiveness in reducing emissions made by supporters of minilateralism. For the purposes of the following discussion, it shall be assumed that there is significant merit in the minilateralist claims in this regard. Certainly the minilateral argument that decision making amongst a small group of key states is easier to affect than consensus decision making across nearly 200 states carries some persuasive weight. likely lack legitimacy within international society (Eckersley 2010 ).
The following section provides a brief outline and history of the United Nations climate regime and three leading small group, non-UN forums for international climate change governance and that were formed over the past five years.
The United Nations climate regime and its others

UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC was formed in 1992 as a global agreement to provide broad principles to guide the human response to climate change. The UNFCCC was formed in response to the scientific advice provided by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 17 The UNFCCC established an agreed global goal of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at a level that will prevent dangerous climate change (art 2), a general obligation on all countries to collect data on and report their greenhouse gas emissions (art 4(1)(a)) and the important burden-sharing principle of 'common but differentiated initially lead the way in emission reduction activities. The US Clinton Administration argued strongly at the Kyoto UNFCCC COP 3 meeting for including market-based flexibility mechanisms in the treaty, namely, emissions trading, joint implementation and a clean development mechanism, to assist the developed countries in meeting their emission targets at a least financial cost (Depledge 1995: 16-19 ).
However, in early in 1997, the US Senate indicated that it would oppose US ratification of any climate change treaty that placed binding emission reductions on developed 
The Asia Pacific Partnership 2005
The launch of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) in mid-2005 came us a surprise to the international community and media. 18 The APP states had provided no prior indication that they were negotiating an international climate change agreement. The partnership was officially announced at a press conference at the 2005 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial meeting in Vientiane, Laos (Downer 2005) . Government Ministers from the six original APP countries (China, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea and the USA) were at the launch (Downer 2005) . The Ministers explained the partnership was an 'innovative and a fresh new development for the environment, for energy, security and for economic development in the region' (Downer 2005 ). An APP 'Vision Statement' was released at the launch however it contained little information on how the partnership would operate. 19 The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Downer, was the first to indicate the official APP position that the partnership was intended to complement the Kyoto Protocol rather than provide an alternative (Downer 2005) . 18 For example, see Brown and Wilson (2005) . 19 See, Asia Pacific Partnership (2009a Partnership ( , 2009b . 
APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration 2007
The represented a shift towards international climate change policy being determined by a sub-group of states, with ENGOs excluded from the APEC forums (Feinberg 2008) .
US Major Economies Process 2007-2008
In early countries, many of which will be impacted hardest by the early climate change impacts.
As discussed above, environmental NGOs in particular have also been largely excluded from attending and lobbying at these non-UN, minilateral forums. However, the 'Danish Proposal' was leaked to the United Kingdom newspaper The Guardian on the second day of the COP 15 meeting (Vidal 2009 ) thereby alienating the vast bulk of states that were unaware of its existence (Phelan 2010 : 15, Rajamani 2010 . The G-77 plus China then denounced the Danish text as "undemocratic, unfair and draft with a lack of transparency" (Meilstrup 2010: 128) . As the negotiations at COP 15 moved towards their final days there was still no agreement on the extensive text being negotiated in the formal UNFCCC meeting process (Meilstrup 2010:128) . A group of 26 state leaders worked over the Thursday night/Friday morning before the closure of the COP to generate a text however failed to reach agreement (Meilstrup 2010: 128; Dimitrov 2010) . Finally, on the Friday before closure of the COP the leaders of five states-China, India, South Africa and Brazil and the USA-met in private and agreed on the modest three page document that became the Copenhagen Accord (Meilstrup 2010: 128; Grubb 2010) . The text of this document was then hastily presented to the group of twenty six other countries that had been seeking to draft an 22 See, for example, Vidal (2009). agreement (Meilstrup 2010: 128) . In the dying hours of COP 15 the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009b) was presented to the meeting for adoption. In a heated and at times acrimonious debate the Copenhagen Accord was rejected by Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Sudan and Tuvalu (Rajamani 2010: 826) . Due to lack of consensus on the text of the Copenhagen Accord the COP only 'noted' rather than 'adopted' the document as a decision (Rajamani 2010: 826) .
Importantly, this history shows the influence of minilateralism on the events at As discussed above, ENGO delegations at COP15 were also highly critical of the unusual opaqueness of negotiations and generation of negotiating texts at the meeting (Fisher 2010; McGregor 2011; Phelan 2010; Rajamani 2010: 3) . The difficulty of NGO involvement at COP15 has been linked to the large number of NGO delegates, poor planning at the conference venue by the host Danish Government and a broadening of the agenda of climate justice groups present at the meeting (Fisher 2010 The exclusive minilateralism discourse is in direct contestation with cosmopolitan democratic version of liberal multilateralism. First, the very significant reduction in franchise advocated by the exclusive minilateral discourse (from all countries concerned with climate change to only the key emitters and/or economically power states) is obviously at odds with the expansion of democratic representation 23 in international institutions that lies at the heart of cosmopolitan democratic project (Held 2006: 170-172 ). The exclusive minilateralism discourse is therefore vulnerable to attack on the basis of its lack of legitimacy and failure to adhere to cosmopolitan democratic ideal of 'all inclusiveness' (Held 2006: 171) . Second, the exclusive minilateralism discourse openly excludes civil society, particularly ENGOs, from participation in meetings of the 'inner sanctum' of decision-making on international climate change policy. This conflicts with cosmopolitan democratic theory that promotes the voice of non-state actors as means of representing the aggregated interests of individuals and as an agent to monitor the accountability of states (Held 2006: 171) . Third, the exclusive minilateralism discourse is also difficult to reconcile with cosmopolitan democratic ideal of enhancing the transparency and accountability of intergovernmental organisations (Held 2006: 172) . In sum, the cosmopolitan democrat should be significantly concerned at the strengthening of the exclusive minilateralism discourse.
The exclusive minilateralism discourse also has potential negative effects upon the level of discursive democracy in international climate governance. Dryzek indicates that in assessing a deliberative system it is important to consider the connections between the 23 Held (2006: 171) explains this expansion of democratic representation in international decision making forums on the basis of a principle of 'all-inclusiveness,' that is 'those whose life expectancy and life chances are significantly affected by social forces and processes ought to have a stake in the determination of the conditions and regulation of these forces and processes, either directly or indirectly through political representatives.'
'public spaces' of social movements, media outlets, internet, public hearings and other popular sites of communication and the 'empowered spaces' of formal collective decision making bodies such as the UNFCCC COP meetings (Dryzek 2010: 10) . He suggests that effective deliberative systems have mechanisms by which public spaces can adequately transmit information and influence to the empowered space and thereby hold the decision makers in the empowered space to account (Dryzek 2010: 10) from minilateral forums remains low there is a significant risk that the subsequent world of three degree plus warming will not be one that is friendly to either cosmopolitan or discursive conceptions of democracy in international climate governance.
25
Arguments against that the consensus decision making rule of the UNFCCC COP process will likely continue to gather strength. As the necessity to act more ambitiously to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions dawns it may well become more difficult to obtain the consent of every state at COP meetings. It is therefore important that the COP reforms its decision making rule to allow for some form of majority decision making that will avoid grid lock in decision making on key issues. Such a proposal is currently being discussed within the UNFCCC 26 and offers a useful starting point for reforming the cosmopolitan design of the COP process. However, there is also the possibility of attempting to formally incorporate some elements of the minilateralism discourse within the UNFCCC COP process. Eckersley (2010 Eckersley ( : 2011 has recently argued that the difficulties of the consensus decision making rule in the UNFCCC might be eased by the formation of a minilateral 'Climate Council' within the COP comprising 15 states that represent 70 percent of world population. The Climate Council would be comprised of the states that are most responsible for climate change, most vulnerable to climate change and with the greatest capacity to respond by providing resources for mitigation and/or adaptation (Eckersley 2010 (Eckersley : 2011 Ford et al. (2006) . 25 For instance, Flannery (2005; 291-295) warns of the danger that a failure of current generations to stem greenhouse gas emissions through democratic may lead to more authoritarian responses when more severe climate change impacts start to appear. 26 In May 2011 Mexico and Papua New Guinea formally proposed that substantive decisions of the COP might be based, in the absence of consensus, on a three quarter majority vote (UNFCCC 2011). 27 Eckersley (2010) suggests that one configuration for membership on the Climate Council would be: the USA UE, Japan, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France , Poland, China, India, Brazil, South Africa and three representatives from the Association of Small Island States, the African Group and the least developed countries. (Eckersley 2010 (Eckersley : 2011 . In order to improve the discursive democratic design of the Climate Council it might also be possible to include representatives from peak NGOs such as Climate Action Network, World Business Council on Sustainable Development and the chairman of the IPCC. The inclusion of these voices from civil society might improve the transmission of influence and accountability between the public spaces of NGO activity and the empowered space of the UNFCCC COP meeting.
Conclusion
The exclusive minilateralism discourse in international climate change governance has strengthened significantly over the past five years through both academic and policy commentary and non-UN climate forums arising chiefly from the Asia-Pacific region.
This experimentation with minilateral forums for climate change negotiations appears also to have also been present in the lead up to and during the Copenhagen COP15
meeting. There is a significant prospect that the exclusive minilateralism discourse will continue to strengthen and further shape global climate change governance. The discourse represents a challenge to the pattern of inclusive multilateral climate governance that has been established in the UN climate regime over the past two decades. A possible response to the exclusive minilateralism discourse is to consider reforming the consensus decision making rule of the UNFCCC to make it easier for the COP to obtain binding agreement on difficult issues relating to mitigation and adaptation. Drawing on Eckersley (2010 Eckersley ( : 2011 , it might also be possible to formally include the exclusive minilateralism discourse within the UNFCCC COP process by the formation of a peak advisory body comprising representatives from the most responsible, vulnerable and capable states and peak environmental, business and scientific NGOs. This body might have a strong advisory role on issues that become bogged down in the wider COP process. Both strategies need to be considered carefully in deciding how the institution of the UNFCCC should respond to the exclusive minilateralism discourse.
